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DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, appellee Hartford 
Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company will herein be called "Hartford." 
Appellant Asael Fair & Sons company will be called "Farr." The other appellees will be 
referred to as follows: Safeco Insurance Company as "Safeco"; American States 
Insurance Company as "American States"; Trustco, Inc. as "Trustco"; Truck Insurance 
Exchange as "Farmers"; Andrew Reed as "Andrew Reed" or "Reed"; Auto-Owners 
Insurance Company as "Auto Owners"; Blackburn Jones Company and E. Kent Jones as 
"Jones"; Stephen D. Kirchen as "Kirchen"; Central Bonds & Insurance Agency and 
Central Bonds and Insurance Company, Inc. as "Central Bonds"; Trinity Universal 
Insurance Company of Kansas, Inc. and Trinity Universal Insurance Co. as "Trinity"; and 
Unitrin Property & Casualty Insurance Group as "Unitrin." 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of x\ppeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for appeal with respect to Appellee Hartford Steam Boiler 
Inspection and Insurance Company is whether the district court properly granted 
Hartford's motion for summary judgment and denied Appellant Asael Farr & Sons 
Company's motion for summary judgment. More specifically, the issue is whether the 
district court's rulings were correct where the basis for all of Farr's causes of action was 
Fair's claim that Hartford was bound by the representations of its alleged agent, 
1 
defendant Andrew R eed, I'' il (I icnnlnn crlnl e\ Klein c .hnwuil Ih.-it h'i I ^i m I 
Hartford's agent and, thus, could not obligate Hartford to anything. 
Summary judgment must be granted when "there is no genuine issue of material 
j:u- -M . . ' • \ 
56(c); Wilcox v Anchor )\ uic, Lu., 2uu7 Li 39, ^flu, 104 i\3d 353, rehearing denied 
(Mav 0 _ ' - .. reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, "the facts and 
fr'i *-'« "' ''^ences draw n ther efrom [are \ iew eel] ii I tl i : light mc 'St fa\ orable to the 
nonmoving party, while the district court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial 
of summary judgment are reviewed for correctness." Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 I T 10, J^ 
8, 1>2 f~M I U." 
This issue was preserved for appeal b> Farr's Third Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory Relief (R. 292-311) tin1 parties' Motions for Summary Judgment and 
responsive inenionuiel.i \\< uk\()-MH){) ,nnl <iiiSN-.0/* L the transcripts of the summary 
judgment motion hearings held before Judge Sandra i 
May 7, 2007 (R. 3534), an< 1 Ji ldge Peuler's Ruling dated June t 5, 2<)<r <VR. 3497-3515). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of an equipment breakdown incident that ca/i lsed tlx s r please of 
ammonia refrigerant, which contaminated ice cream products in Farr's cold storage 
facility \ fter Far i i ealized that its insurance coverage for this type of loss was limited to 
$25,000 and did not cover the total amo : ' ^ . , 
claiming that they were liable KM F.MT"-> lo^es. Fur alleged that some defendants, 
iiik'hklifti» Haitloixi \\ei\ liable because they had a principal-agent relationship with 
2 
defendant Andrew Reed, who Farr claimed promised to provide the "necessary and 
appropriate insurance coverage for all of [Fair's] significant insurable risks." 
The defendants moved for summary judgment. Hartford argued in its motion that 
there was no agency relationship between it and Andrew Reed. Farr cross-moved for 
summary judgment, arguing, for the first time, that an oral binder of insurance required 
some defendants, including Hartford, to provide Farr with unlimited insurance coverage. 
The district court rejected this argument as not properly pled, denied Farr's motion for 
summary judgment, and granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. This 
appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Farr manufactures, stores, distributes, and markets ice cream, soft serve ice 
cream mixes, and frozen desserts. (R. 296 at f 20; R. 2178 at Tf 1; R. 1672-73). 
2. As part of its business, Fair owns and operates a cold storage warehouse 
located at 2575 South 300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 300 at f 26; R. 1676). 
Farr's Insurance Coverage History 
3. Trinity Universal Insurance Company of Kansas ("Trinity") provided 
insurance, including "Equipment Breakdown" coverage, to Farr for the policy year May 
14, 2002 to May 14, 2003, (R. 947-1081; R. 1087-95 (Deposition of Dexter Duane Farr 
("D. Farr Depo") at 39:23-45:8)). 
4. The Trinity policy's Equipment Breakdown Coverage provided coverage 
for the loss of Farr's perishable goods due to contamination from the release of 
3 
refrigerant, subject to a $25,000 limit of liability. (R. 966, 986-991; R. 1087-95 (D. Farr 
Depo at 39:23-45:8)). 
5. On March 31, 2003, Trinity sent Farr a notice of non-renewal, effective 
May 14, 2003. (R. 1118; R. 1093-95 (D. Farr Depo at 45:9-47:13)). 
6. After the Trinity notice of non-renewal, Farr sought to find replacement 
insurance coverage for the expiring Trinity policy. (R. 1096 (D. Farr Depo at 48:1-25)). 
7. In or about March 2003, Andrew Reed ("Reed"), who was Fair's agent for 
its workers compensation coverage, contacted Farr regarding Fair's property, equipment 
breakdown, and liability insurance. (R. 1097-98 (D. Fair Depo at 55:9-56:13)). 
8. Reed was a captive agent of the Farmers Group of Insurance Companies 
("Farmers"). (R. 1124, 1126-27, 1139-40 (Deposition of Andrew Reed ("Reed Depo") at 
53:1-13, 124:23-125:12, 395:25-396:20)). 
9. Reed was not an employee of Hartford. (R. 1141-1142 (Reed Depo at 
397:24-398:8)). 
10. Reed did not have an agency contract with Hartford. (R. 1141-42 (Reed 
Depo at 397:24-398:8)). 
11. Hartford did not give Andrew Reed authority to act on Hartford's behalf. 
(R. 1142 (Reed Depo at 398:15-24); see also R. 1125, 1128-29, 1143-44 (Reed Depo at 
121:7-16, 264:22-265:5, 399:4-400:19)). 
12. Hartford did not have the right to control Andrew Reed. (R. 1142-43 (Reed 
Depo at 398:25-399:3)). 
4 
13. In March 2003, Dexter Farr, Fair's General Manager, met with Reed 
regarding Farr's property, equipment breakdown, and liability insurance. (R. 1099-1100 
(D. Farr Depo at 59:22-60:10)). 
14. In March 2003, Dexter Farr provided Andrew Reed with portions of the 
expiring Trinity policy. (R. 1099-1101 (D. Farr Depo at 59:22-64:5)). 
15. During Reed's conversations with Dexter Farr, Reed suggested that Fan-
would be well-served by increasing its inventory coverage. (See R. 1726-27 (D. Farr 
Depo at 102-103); R. 1829, 1832-33 (Reed Depo at 157-161, 172-174)). 
16. Dexter Farr rejected that suggestions and directed Reed to procure coverage 
comparable to that which Farr possessed under the cancelled Trinity policy. (See R. 
1726-27 (D. Farr Depo at 102-103); R. 1829, 1832-33 (Reed Depo at 158-161, 172-174)). 
17. Andrew Reed submitted a proposal for property, equipment breakdown, 
and liability insurance to Farr. (R. 1147-48; R. 1113-1114 (D. Farr Depo at 100:10-
101:11)). 
18. Farr obtained several other proposals for property, liability, and equipment 
breakdown insurance for the May 14, 2003 - May 14, 2004 policy year. (R. 1096 (D. 
Farr Depo at 48:9-15)). 
19. Farr accepted Reed's proposal because it had the best price, that is, the 
lowest premium cost. (R. 1105-1107 (D. Farr Depo at 76:8-78:23)). 
20. Farmers declined to provide the insurance coverage to Farr. (R. 1111-12 
(D. Farr Depo at 85:15-86:1); R. 1130-1131 (Reed Depo at 97:16-98:11)). 
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21. Reed contacted Troy Granger ("Granger") of Trustco ("Trustco"), an 
insurance brokerage company, to see if Trustco could place the coverage for Farr. (R. 
1132-33 (Reed Depo at 213:11-214:24)). 
22. Trustco was able to place the coverage with American States Insurance 
Company ("American States"), an affiliate of Safeco ("Safeco"). (R. 1158 (Deposition of 
Troy Granger ("Granger Depo) at 23:5-25:24)). 
23. Dexter Farr, Farr's General Manager, signed a letter directed to Safeco 
designating Trustco as Farr's broker of record. (R. 1165; R. 1109-1112 (D. Farr Depo at 
83:25-86:14)). 
24. American States issued its policy to Farr for the policy period May 23, 
2003 to May 23, 2004. (R. 300 at 125); R. 1167; R. 1938; R. 2182). 
25. The American States policy's Equipment Breakdown Coverage provided 
coverage for the loss of Farr's perishable goods due to contamination from the release of 
refrigerant, including ammonia, subject to a $25,000 limit of liability. (R. 1167; R. 1225-
29).1 
The Hartford Reinsurance Agreement 
26. Hartford entered into a reinsurance agreement with Safeco and its affiliated 
property and casualty companies effective December 31, 2000. (R. 1320 at 12). 
27. Under the reinsurance agreement between Hartford and Safeco, Hartford 
agreed to reinsure 100% of the Equipment Breakdown liability under policies issued by 
1
 While the insurance policy at issue here was issued by Safeco's subsidiary American 
States, Farr refers to it as the "Safeco policy" throughout its brief. For purposes of 
consistency, Hartford will also refer the American States policy as the "Safeco policy." 
6 
Safeco and its affiliated companies to their policyholders, subject to the Reinsurance 
Agreement's terms, conditions, limitations, and exclusions. (R. 1320 at If 3). 
Fair's Loss 
28. On May 29, 2003, an electric condenser fan motor in Fair's Salt Lake City 
cold storage warehouse accidentally sheared off its mount and severed an ammonia 
refrigeration line. (R. 300 at Tf 26; R. 2203 at 1J63; R. 1720-21 (D. Farr Depo at 89-90)). 
29. As a result, ammonia was released and contaminated the ice cream products 
stored in Fair's warehouse, causing damages alleged to be in excess of $1.5 million. (R. 
2006-2008; R. 300-301 at ffl[ 26, 27; R. 2203 at f 62; R. 1720-22 (D. Farr Depo at 89-
91)). 
30. Thereafter, Farr notified American States of the loss. (R. 301 at j^ 28; R. 
2203 at | 62; R. 1722-24 (D. Farr Depo at 90-93)). 
31. American States paid Farr $25,000—the policy limit of liability—for 
ammonia contamination of Farr's products. (R. 1322-30, 1324). 
The Lawsuit 
32. On or about July 7, 2004, Farr sued Hartford and others alleging causes of 
action for breach of contract, negligence, and bad faith. (R. 1332-1344). 
33. On or about May 31, 2005, Farr filed its the Third Amended Complaint, 
adding other parties and alleging two additional causes of actions—equitable estoppel 
and declaratory relief. (See generally R. 292-311). 
34. Farr's Third Amended Complaint alleged that Reed, acting both for himself 
and as the duly authorized agent for TIE, Trustco, Safeco, American, Hartford, Kirchen, 
7 
Central Agency, Central Bonds and Auto-Owners, received payment for and 
affirmatively represented to Farr that the listed insurance professionals had duly bound 
and provided Farr with all necessary and appropriate insurance coverage for all of Fair's 
significant insurable risks, including all insurable risks related to Fair's ice cream 
inventory. (R. 299 at If 21). 
35. The Third Amended Complaint also alleged that pursuant to Reed's 
actions, the various defendants had agreed, committed, and become jointly obligated to 
provide Farr with all such necessary, available and appropriate insurance coverage for all 
of Fair's ice cream inventory and all of Farr's significant insurable risks, effective May 
14, 2003. (R. 299 at ^ 21). 
36. On or about May 9, 2006, Farr moved for leave to file a Fourth Amended 
Complaint to add new parties and additional claims. (R. 585-609). 
37. District Court Judge Sandra N. Peuler denied Fair's motion for leave to file 
its Fourth Amended Complaint. (R. 3497-3515, 3502). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Fair's Third Amended Complaint was the operative complaint for purposes of the 
parties' summary judgment motions. In that complaint, Farr claimed that the various 
defendants were liable for breach of contract, negligence, bad faith, and promissory 
estoppel. The basis for all of those causes of action against Hartford was "Reed's 
Commitment"—the claim that defendant Andrew Reed, while acting as the duly 
authorized agent for Hartford, represented that Hartford bound coverage for all of Fair's 
insurable risks. But it is uncontroverted that Reed was not Hartford's agent and, thus, 
8 
could not and did not obligate Hartford to the "Reed's Commitment." Accordingly, 
summary judgment was properly granted. 
In the trial court and here on appeal, Farr sought summary judgment and sought to 
avoid summary judgment on a new theory of liability—that some defendants, including 
Hartford, breached the terms of an "oral binder" of unlimited insurance. But Farr's 
motion for leave to amend its complaint to add this new theory of liability was denied, 
and the propriety of that denial is not challenged here on appeal.2 Thus, the trial court 
correctly declined to address the new claims on summary judgment. 
But even if Farr's new "oral binder" claim had been properly before the trial court, 
summary judgment in favor of Hartford was still appropriate because the terms of the oral 
binder of insurance included the same $25,000 limitation for ammonia contamination 
losses that was included in Farr's prior policy and in the subsequently issued policy. 
2
 Farr also does not challenge the propriety of summary judgment granted to Hartford on 
its bad faith claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Address Claims Not Pled in 
Farr's Operative Complaint 
Fair argues that the trial court erred in refusing to consider its claims regarding an 
alleged breach of an oral binder of insurance and policy ambiguity. See Farr's Brief at 
19-21. But because these claims were not pled in Farr's operative complaint, the trial 
court correctly disregarded them. 
A party cannot move for summary judgment on a theory of liability not pled in its 
complaint. See, e.g., Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 
2000) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' claims based on theory of liability not pled in 
complaint, which were raised for first time in motions for summary judgment); Josey v. 
John R. Hollingworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 641-42 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); see also 
Cooper v. S Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Any claims not asserted in 
Plaintiffs Complaint are properly dismissed."). 
Similarly, a plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment based on a claim that is not 
pled in its complaint. As the court in Northern States Power Co. v. Federal Transit 
Administration, 358 F.3d 1050, 1057 (8th Cir. 2004) stated, "while we recognize that the 
pleading requirements under the Federal Rules are relatively permissive, they do not 
entitle parties to manufacture claims, which were not pled, late in the litigation for the 
purpose of avoiding summary judgment." See also Nucor v. Aceros Y Maquilas de 
Occidente, 28 F.3d 572, 588 (7th Cir. 1994) (party cannot avoid summary judgment on 
issue not properly pled); Owen v. Kroger Co., 936 F. Supp. 579, 586 (S.D. Ind. 1996) 
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(holding that "plaintiffs promissory estoppel arguments are not properly before the court 
and [the court] need not consider them on the merits" where promissory estoppel which 
was not raised in the complaint, and the court denied plaintiffs motion to amend its 
complaint to add a promissory estoppel claim); Bass v. Hendrix, 931 F. Supp. 523, 538 
(S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that plaintiff could not defeat summary judgment by relying on 
a claim for negligent misrepresentation that had not been pled in her complaint). 
Here, Fair sought summary judgment and sought to avoid summary judgment by 
arguing (1) that an "oral binder" was issued on May 23, 2003, by which Hartford (and 
others) allegedly orally bound insurance coverage with unlimited coverage for "ammonia 
contamination" losses and (2) that the subsequently issued policy was ambiguous. But 
there is no mention, let alone a claim, of any May 23, 2003 oral insurance binder in Fair's 
Third Amended Complaint. {See R. 292-311). Nor is there any claim in the Third 
Amended Complaint that the subsequently issued insurance policy was ambiguous. {See 
R. 292-311). 
Rather, Farr's claims against Hartford in its operative Third Amended Complaint 
are based on Hartford's alleged failure to perform obligations under the so-called "Reed's 
Commitment," a set of promises made to Farr by Andrew Reed on May 14, 2003: 
On or about May 14, 2003, Reed, while acting both for 
himself and as the duly authorized agent for TIE, Trustco, 
Safeco, American, Hartford, Kirchen, Central Agency, 
Central Bonds and Auto-Owners ("Primary Defendants"), had 
received payment for and affirmatively represented to 
plaintiff (a) that the Primary Defendants had duly bound and 
provided plaintiff with all necessary and appropriate 
insurance coverage for all of plaintiffs significant insurable 
risks, including all insurable risks related to Plaintiffs 
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Products, and (b) that the Primary Defendants, and each, [sic] 
of them [,] had agreed, committed, and become jointly 
obligated to provide plaintiff with all such necessary, 
available and appropriate insurance coverage for all of 
Plaintiffs Products and all of plaintiff s significant insurable 
risks ("Reed's Commitment"), effective May 14, 2003. 
(R. 299 at f 21). 
Farr sought leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint that included the "oral 
binder" and "policy ambiguity" claims, but the trial court denied that motion. (R. 585-
609; R. 3497-3515, 3502). And Farr does not challenge the propriety of the trial court's 
denial of that motion on appeal. 
So because the "oral binder" and "policy ambiguity" claims were not included in 
the operative Third Amended Complaint, they were not properly before the trial court on 
summary judgment, and the trial court properly refused to consider them. 
II. The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of Hartford 
Because Andrew Reed Was Not Hartford's Agent and Could Not Obligate 
Hartford to the "Reed's Commitment." 
In its operative complaint, Farr claimed that the various defendants were liable for 
breach of contract, negligence, bad faith, and promissory estoppel. The basis for all of 
those causes of action against Hartford was "Reed's Commitment"—the claim that 
defendant Andrew Reed, while acting as the duly authorized agent for Hartford, 
represented that Hartford bound coverage for all of Fair's insurable risks. But as 
explained below, it is uncontro verted that Reed was not Hartford's agent and, thus, could 
not and did not obligate Hartford to the "Reed's Commitment." 
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"To be an agent, a person must be authorized by another to 'act on his behalf and 
subject to his control.5" Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 
(Utah 1999) (quoting in part Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)). Thus, to 
prevail, Farr must prove that Hartford authorized Reed to act on its behalf and subject to 
its control. See, e.g., id.; Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
In other words, Reed cannot by his acts or statements create an agency relationship. 
Rather, "[a]n agency relationship can arise only at the will and by the act of the 
principal." Wardley Corp., 962 P.2d at 89. 
Where, as here, an agent has no such authority to act on behalf of an insurer (the 
principal), Utah courts have found that no agency relationship exists. The case Vina v. 
Jefferson Insurance Co. of New York, 761 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) is illustrative. 
There, Vina subleased a tavern to Pencille. Pencille agreed to insure Vina's equipment 
on the premises. Id. at 583. Thereafter, Vina and Pencille met with Dunn, a licensed 
insurance agent and broker, to discuss procuring insurance for the tavern. Dunn then 
placed the coverage through Transwestern General Agency, with Jefferson Insurance 
Company as the insurer. Id. Later, and unbeknownst to Vina, Pencille instructed Dunn 
to cancel the Jefferson policy effective November 28, 1979 because she was going to 
cease operation of the tavern on that date. Id. The Jefferson policy was canceled, but 
Pencilled tavern did not cease operations. And in December 1979, the tavern was fire-
bombed and Vina's quipment suffered extensive damage. Id. 
Vina then sued Jefferson and Transwestern, claiming that they improperly 
canceled his insurance policy without his knowledge or consent and, therefore, should 
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pay his insurance claim for the fire-damaged equipment. Id, The trial court, however, 
found that Dunn was not an agent of Jefferson or Transwestem but rather was an agent of 
Vina and Pencille for purposes of obtaining insurance coverage. Id, at 584. Accordingly, 
the trial court ruled that the Jefferson policy was effectively canceled and Vina's losses 
were not covered. Id, 
This Court affirmed, holding that Dunn was not the agent of Jefferson and 
Transwestem under general agency principles: 
Vina and Pencille gave Dunn discretion to choose an 
insurance policy for them based on the best price he could 
find. Dunn was unable to obtain the desired policy from any 
of the companies for whom he was a licensed insurance agent 
and, as a result, contacted Transwestem. . . . Dunn received a 
premium quote from Transwestem and communicated it to 
Vina and Pencille and they authorized him to secure the 
insurance policy. Dunn procured insurance for Vina both 
before and after the loss occurred in this matter, none of it 
through Transwestem or Jefferson. . . . Furthermore, the 
facts do not indicate that Transwestem or Jefferson 
authorized Dunn to act for them to any significant degree, 
except to perform ministerial acts. He could not act on their 
behalf to establish or alter the business relationship between 
Jefferson and Vina. Therefore, the trial court's finding that 
Dunn was not the agent of Transwestem or Jefferson, but the 
agent of Vina, when he cancelled the policy is not clearly 
erroneous. 
Id, at 586. 
Here, as in Vina, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that Andrew Reed was 
not Hartford's agent. Rather, Reed was a captive Farmers agent. (R. 1124, 1126-27, 
1139-40 (Reed Depo at 53:1-13, 124:23-125:12, 395:25-396:20)) Hartford did not 
authorize Reed to act as its agent. (R. 1141-42 (Reed Depo at 398:15-24); see also R. 
1125; 1128-29, 1143-44 (Reed Depo at 121:7-16, 264:22-265:5, 399:4-400:19)). And 
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Hartford had no right to control Reed. (R. 1142-43 (Reed Depo at 398:25-399:3)). Thus, 
as in Vina, judgment in Hartford's favor was appropriate as a matter of law. 
III. Even If Fair's "Oral Binder" Claim Was Properly Before the Trial Court 
Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted in Favor of Hartford Because the 
Oral Binder Included the Same $25,000 Limitation for Ammonia 
Contamination Losses that Was Included in the Subsequently Issued Policy. 
Farr also argues that its "oral binder" claim was properly before the trial court 
because its Third Amended Complaint could be read to include such a claim. See Fan-
Brief at 20. Notably, the words "oral binder" do not appear anywhere in the Third 
Amended Complaint. But even assuming arguendo that the Third Amended Compaint 
included the "oral binder" claim, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of Hartford. 
1. The Terms of Coverage Afforded Under a Binder are Those Terms of the 
Subsequently Issued Policy Which Limited Coverage for Ammonia 
Contamination Losses to $25,000, 
Farr contends that when Safeco—through its alleged agent Trustco—orally bound 
coverage, it provided insurance coverage without any limitations or exclusions. See id. at 
21-26. But that argument is supported neither by the facts nor the law. Indeed, as 
explained below, there was no oral agreement to provide unlimited insurance coverage, 
and the terms of coverage under a binder are the same as those in the subsequently issued 
policy. And the subsequently issued policy included a $25,000 limit for ammonia 
contamination losses. 
A binder is a temporary contract of insurance. E.g., Phoenix Indem. Ins. Co. v. 
Bell, 896 P.2d 32, 36 (Utah. Ct. App. 1995). It "temporarily binds insurance coverage 
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pending the issuance of an insurance policy." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-102 (1). The 
use of insurance binders "is a common and necessary practice in the world of insurance, 
where speed often is of the essence, for the agent to use this quick and informal device to 
record the giving of protection pending the execution and delivery of a more 
conventionally detailed policy of insurance." Employers Commercial Union Ins, Co, v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 384 N.E.2d 668, 670 (N.Y. 1978). 
Courts have recognized that if a loss occurs before the formal policy is issued, 
coverage is determined by the terms of the subsequently issued policy. Indeed, as one 
commentator put it: "In the event a claim arises before the actual policy is issued, the 
general rule is that the binder provides only as much coverage as the policy would have 
provided; one who accepts a binder accepts all of the terms of the underlying insurance 
contract." 1 Allan D. Windt, Insurance Claims & Disputes § 6:36 (5th ed. 2007). See 
also 12A John A. Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 7232, at 
179-83 (1981) ("The terms and provisions which control in the construction of coverage 
afforded by a binder are those contained in the ordinary form of policy usually issued by 
the company at that time upon similar risks."); A Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, 
Couch on Insurance § 13:1 (3d ed. 2006) ("Generally, a binder contemplates a 
subsequent and more formal agreement, and by its nature incorporates the terms of the 
prospective policy whether those terms are prescribed by law or are part of the customary 
policy issued by the insurer."). 
Courts in a number of jurisdictions have endorsed these principles. See, e.g., Med. 
Care Am., Inc. v. Natl Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 341 F.3d 415, 420-21 (5th 
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Cir. 2003) ("an insurance binder provides coverage according to the terms and provisions 
of the ordinary form of the contemplated policy"); Acadia Ins. Co. v. Allied Marine 
Transp. LLC, 151 F. Supp. 2d 107, 125 (D. Me. 2001) ("where the parties to a temporary 
contract for insurance do not specifically agree upon all essential terms, they are 
presumed to have contemplated the terms, conditions, and limitations in the ordinary 
form of the policy usually issued by the company at that time on similar risks."); 
Statewide Ins. Corp. v. Dewar, 69'4 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) ("The binder 
incorporates by implication all the terms of the policy to be issued."); Unigard Sec. Ins. 
Co. v. Mission Ins. Co. Trust, 12 P.3d 296, 299 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) ("Absent an 
express agreement to the contrary, a binder incorporates the terms of the contemplated 
policy."); Maxton v. Garegnani, 627 N.E.2d 723, 727 (111. App. Ct. 1994) ("When an 
insurance binder does not specify the terms and the provisions of the policy applied for, 
it, as a matter of law, incorporates all of the terms and provisions of the policy for which 
application through the binder is made."). 
Thus, the alleged oral binder necessarily incorporated the terms of the 
subsequently issued Safeco policy. And that policy—just as Fair's prior policy—limited 
coverage for ammonia contamination losses to $25,000. 
Although Farr argues that the oral binder here provided unlimited insurance 
coverage, the evidence does not support that assertion. For such an insurance binder to 
exist, Farr would have to show a "manifestation of mutual assent" with "defmitude and 
certainty of terms." Siddoway v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 464 P.2d 394, 395 (Utah 1970). 
But here, there are no facts that would support any manifestation of mutual assent that 
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Farr had unlimited insurance coverage for any loss that took place. Indeed, it is 
undisputed that Troy Granger of Trustco—who allegedly agreed to bind coverage on 
behalf of Safeco—had no conversations with anyone from Farr prior to May 29, 2003 
(the day of Fair's ammonia contamination loss). (R. 1907-08 (Granger Depo at 73:5-
74:12)). If Farr did not even speak with Trustco's representatives before the May 23, 
2003 oral binder, it is impossible for the parties to have mutually agreed that Farr had 
unlimited insurance coverage. 
In sum, if the oral binder claimed by Farr exists, it must incorporate the terms of 
the Safeco policy that was subsequently issued to Farr. And that policy limited coverage 
for ammonia contamination losses to $25,000. The oral binder was not breached because 
Safeco paid Farr $25,000, the policy limit of liability for ammonia contamination losses. 
(R. 1322-30, 1324). 
2. Hartford Had No Duty to Disclose or Explain the $25,000 Ammonia 
Contamination Limitation, 
Farr suggests that the $25,000 limitation for ammonia contamination losses is 
unenforceable because Hartford failed to disclose or explain that limitation to Farr at the 
time the binder was issued. See Farr Brief at 21-26. But Hartford had no such obligation. 
Indeed, as Farr acknowledges, Hartford's only role here was as reinsurer for Safeco. See 
Farr Brief at 5, 24. There is no authority supporting the argument that a reinsurer has a 
duty to disclose or explain to an insured limitations in policies that the reinsurer 
reinsures. 
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Furthermore, Farr fails to mention that the very same $25,000 limitation for 
ammonia contamination losses that Hartford (and others) allegedly failed to disclose and 
explain was in the Fair's policy that just expired and was being replaced by the Safeco 
policy. (R. 966, 986-991; R. 1087-95 (D. Farr Depo at 39:23-45:8)). Thus, Farr can 
hardly claim surprise by the limitation. Farr also fails to mention that Andrew Reed 
recommended to Farr that it purchase increased coverage for ammonia contamination 
losses, but was instructed by Dexter Farr that he was to provide an "apples-to-apples" 
price comparison with the expiring policy. (R. 1726-27 (D. Farr Depo at 102-103), R. 
1829, 1832-33 (Reed Depo at 157-161 and 172-174)). These facts negate Farr's assertion 
that Safeco somehow bound unlimited insurance coverage. 
In sum, Farr presents no authority to suggest that Hartford had any duty to disclose 
or explain limitations in policies that it reinsured. As a reinsurer, Hartford had no contact 
with Farr and had no obligation to do any more than to honor its reinsurance contract 
with Safeco. Summary judgment was properly granted in Hartford's favor. 
IV. Even If Fair's "Policy Ambiguity" Claim Was Properly Before the Trial 
Court the Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of 
Hartford Because the Ammonia Contamination Limitation is Clear and 
Unambiguous, 
Farr also claims that the trial court should have considered whether summary 
judgment was appropriate based on its "policy ambiguity" claim. See Farr Brief at 21. 
But nowhere in its appellate brief does Farr actually argue that the $25,000 limitation for 
ammonia contamination losses is ambiguous. Nor would there be merit to any such 
argument. 
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To be sure, the terms of the applicable limitation in the Safeco policy's Equipment 
Breakdown Endorsement are clear and unambiguous: 
Unless otherwise shown in the Equipment Breakdown 
Schedule, the following coverages also apply to loss caused 
by or resulting from an "accident" to "covered equipment". 
These coverages do not provide additional amounts of 
insurance. 
* * * 
(c) Spoilage 
* * * 
(ii) we will also pay for your loss of "perishable 
goods" due to contamination from the release of 
refrigerant, including but not limited to 
ammonia. 
The most we will pay for loss or damage under this 
coverage is $25,000 unless otherwise shown in the 
Equipment Breakdown Schedule. 
(R. 1225-26). Farr has not argued, let alone demonstrated, that this limitation is in any 
way ambiguous. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Hartford. The 
basis for all of Farr's causes of action against Hartford in Farr's operative complaint was 
"Reed's Commitment"—the claim that defendant Andrew Reed, while acting as the duly 
authorized agent for Hartford, represented that Hartford bound coverage for all of Farr's 
insurable risks. But it is uncontroverted that Reed was not Hartford's agent and, thus, 
could not and did not obligate Hartford to the "Reed's Commitment." 
Farr's arguments based on an alleged breach of an oral binder of insurance and 
policy ambiguity are not properly before this Court because these claims were not pled in 
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Fair's operative complaint. And even if they were, summary judgment was properly 
granted in favor of Hartford because when Safeco orally bound coverage, it provided 
coverage in accordance with the subsequently issued policy, which included a clear and 
unambiguous $25,000 limit for ammonia contamination losses. Accordingly, summary 
judgment must be affirmed. 
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